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The legal regulation of Muslim dress is controversial in the
UK, but education could help eradicate prejudice
Segments of British society continue to feel uneasy about the idea of Muslim religious dress, particularly when
it concerns the covering of women’s faces. The recent debate triggered by a Birmingham court’s introduction
and then reversion of a ban on defendants wearing the veil presents a meaningful opportunity for non-Muslims
to learn about the significance of religious dress to Islam, argues Claire Overman.
Muslim dress has f eatured heavily in
the Brit ish media of  late. Birmingham
Metropolitan College instituted, then reversed, a ban on veils. A Crown Court judge has ruled that a
def endant must remove her veil when giving evidence in court. Home Of f ice minister Jeremy Browne has
called f or national debate over whether the state should step in to protect young women f rom having the
veil “imposed” on them. If  such debate is to occur, a usef ul starting point will be to see how Muslim dress
has been treated so f ar in the Brit ish courts.
The right to manif est one’s religion is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9,
which states:
1. Everyone has the right to f reedom of  thought, conscience and religion; this right includes f reedom to
change his religion or belief  and f reedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, and to manif est his religion or belief , in worship, teaching, practice and observance
2. Freedom to manif est one’s religion or belief s shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of  public saf ety, f or the
protection of  public order, health or morals, or f or the protection of  the rights and f reedoms of
others.
This Article is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1, and theref ore the courts
must uphold it. It should be noted however that, while the f reedom to have a religion or belief  is absolute,
the f reedom to manif est this religion (f or instance, through religious dress) is expressly restricted by Article
9(2). Any restrictions must comply with the conditions set out in that paragraph. At domestic level, the
Equality Act 2010 also provides protection f or individuals wearing religious dress.
Domestic court decisions on Muslim dress have f ocused on two main areas: courtrooms and schools. As
mentioned above, the most recent decision regarding Muslim dress has held that the niqaab, the f ace-
covering veil, is not to be worn by a def endant when giving evidence in a criminal trial. While the judge
acknowledged the def endant’s right to manif est her religion under Article 9 ECHR, he accepted that a
limitation on that right in the courtroom satisf ied the requirements in Article 9(2). This was f or two main
reasons. First, the alleged victim had a competing right: the right to a f air trial, guaranteed by Article 6 of  the
European Convention. This right would be violated where a judge and jury were not able to observe the
def endant’s reaction under cross-examination. Secondly, if  a def endant were able to assert the right to
wear a niqaab during her trial, this would deprive the court of  control over its own procedure. In order to
protect the principles of  law on which the court’s processes are based, the def endant’s right would
theref ore have to be limited.
The garment at issue in the case of  R (Begum) v Governors of  Denbigh High School was the jilbab, a long
coat- like garment which ef f ectively concealed the shape of  the f emale body. In this case, the school, 79%
of  whose students were Muslim, had agreed with parent committees and religious experts on a school
unif orm appropriate f or Muslim students. The complainant, a student, wished to wear the jilbab, which was
deemed a more restrictive f orm of  dress. The school ref used to accede to her request. In upholding the
school’s appeal, the House of  Lords advanced dif f ering justif ications. The majority did not even consider
there to be an interf erence with the student’s right to manif est her religious belief , as her sister had
adopted the school’s unif orm without problem and the student herself , who had originally worn the unif orm
without complaint, was f ree to apply to a dif f erent local school in which the jilbab was permitted.
However, the judges were unanimous in holding that even if  there had been interf erence, it was justif ied
under Article 9(2). The school, having ensured that its unif orm policy was acceptable to mainstream Muslim
opinion, was entit led to uphold it, and there was a f ear that allowing one student to wear more
conservative dress would pressurise other Muslim girls to do the same. Interestingly, this case was
distinguished in R (on the application of  Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School , a case which
concerned the wearing of  a kara, a thin Sikh bangle. In that case, it was stated that, as the kara was much
less ostentatious than the niqaab or jilbab, it would be unlikely to disrupt the sense of  community f ostered
by the school unif orm, or to make the pupil stand out. Theref ore, the pupil was entit led to wear it with her
school unif orm.
From these cases, there is a sense that Muslim clothing is seen as divisive. This may be between Muslim
f emales themselves, who interpret the dress requirements of  their religion in more or less conservative
ways, or between Muslims and non-Muslims. There is also a suggestion that it can be seen as repressive
of  women. This line of  argument was crit icised in R v D, in which the judge pointed out that ‘the niqaab is
worn by choice by many spiritually-minded, thoughtf ul and intelligent women, who do not deserve to be
demeaned by superf icial and uninf ormed crit icisms of  their choice.’ However, on the f acts in Begum, there
appeared to be a suggestion that the student, only a teenager at the time, may not have made the choice
to adopt the jilbab entirely f reely. Nevertheless, is interesting that other f orms of  religious dress have not
come under the same kind of  scrutiny. For example, there is no popular outcry that young Sikh men are
pressured into wearing the dastar, the Sikh turban.
If  it can be accepted, as R v D shows, that there are instances in which there are sound practical reasons
f or the removal of  the veil, the question is theref ore whether there is any wider justif ication f or the state to
regulate Muslim dress. One particular danger is that the arguments advanced in f avour of  intervention are
based on ignorance or prejudice. For instance, one argument of ten seen f or the restriction of  Muslim dress
is that the dif f iculty of  interaction between a veiled woman and other individuals causes divisions within
society. However, the question which then arises is why it should be Muslims who alter their practices. If
national debate on the issue is to be had, it could in f act provide a marvellous opportunity f or non-Muslims
to learn more about the signif icance of  religious dress to Islam. Fostering community relations and diversity
need not mean the enf orced banning of  all religious dress, or worse still, only that which we f ind of f ensive,
but could equally be achieved by the permitt ing of  all kinds of  dress, and an emphasis on educating the
public about the meaning behind it.
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